Three questions about Leplin's reliabilism

Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43 - 50 (2007)
Jarrett Leplin’s paper is multifaceted; it’s rich with ideas, and I won’t even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I’d like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.
Keywords Leplin  Reliabilism
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DOI 10.2307/40208699
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