David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):634-635 (1998)
(1) Van Gelder's concession that the dynamical hypothesis is not in opposition to computation in general does not agree well with his anticomputational stance. (2) There are problems with the claim that dynamic systems allow for nonrepresentational aspects of computation in a way in which digital computation cannot. (3) There are two senses of the “cognition is computation” claim and van Gelder argues against only one of them. (4) Dynamical systems as characterized in the target article share problems of universal realizability with formal notions of computation, but differ in that there is no solution available for them. (5) The dynamical hypothesis cannot tell us what cognition is, because instantiating a particular dynamical system is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a cognitive agent.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Fred A. Keijzer, Sacha Ben & Lex van der Heijden (1998). The Dynamics of What? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):644-645.
J. Richard Eiser (1998). The Dynamical Hypothesis in Social Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):638-638.
James P. Crutchfield (1998). Dynamical Embodiments of Computation in Cognitive Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):635-635.
Chris Eliasmith (1997). Computation and Dynamical Models of Mind. Minds and Machines 7 (4):531-41.
Tim van Gelder (1998). The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
Michael Wheeler (1998). An Appeal for Liberalism, or Why Van Gelder's Notion of a Dynamical System is Too Narrow for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):653-654.
Nick Chater & Ulrike Hahn (1998). What is the Dynamical Hypothesis? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):633-634.
Tim van Gelder (1998). Disentangling Dynamics, Computation, and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):654-661.
Frank van der Velde & Marc de Kamps (1998). Toward a Synthesis of Dynamical Systems and Classical Computation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):652-653.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #193,932 of 1,796,206 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #208,919 of 1,796,206 )
How can I increase my downloads?