David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560 (2005)
The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Mind Qualia Reduction|
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Matthew J. Brown (2009). Models and Perspectives on Stage: Remarks on Giere's Scientific Perspectivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):213-220.
Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin (2013). The Structure of Color Experience and the Existence of Surface Colors. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
Dave Ward (2012). Why Don't Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.
Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.
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