Demonstrative concepts without reidentification

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201 (2006)
Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual
Keywords Concept  Demonstrative  Experience  Metaphysics  Perception  Kelly, Sean
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    J. Dokic (2001). Shades and Concepts. Analysis 61 (3):193-201.

    View all 24 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.

    View all 9 citations

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