PhilPapers is currently in read-only mode while we are performing some maintenance. You can use the site normally except that you cannot sign in. This shouldn't last long.

Epistemic norms without voluntary control

Noûs 43 (4):599-632 (2009)
Abstract William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
Keywords epistemic norms  epistemic normativity  normativity  doxastic voluntarism  voluntary control  'ought' implies 'can'
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
    Rico Vitz, Doxastic Voluntarism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stephen Grimm (2009). ``Epistemic Normativity&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Matthew Chrisman (2008). Ought to Believe. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-11-26

    Total downloads

    157 ( #2,380 of 556,837 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    15 ( #4,815 of 556,837 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums