Noûs 43 (4):599-632 (2009)
|Abstract||William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.|
|Keywords||epistemic norms epistemic normativity normativity doxastic voluntarism voluntary control 'ought' implies 'can'|
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