Epistemic norms without voluntary control

Noûs 43 (4):599-632 (2009)
Abstract
William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
Keywords epistemic norms  epistemic normativity  normativity  doxastic voluntarism  voluntary control  'ought' implies 'can'
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Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (2014). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Matthew Chrisman (2008). Ought to Believe. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Stephen R. Grimm (2009). Epistemic Normativity. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 243-264.
Rico Vitz, Doxastic Voluntarism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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