David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (4):599-632 (2009)
William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.
|Keywords||epistemic norms epistemic normativity normativity doxastic voluntarism voluntary control 'ought' implies 'can'|
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (forthcoming). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Rik Peels (2013). Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility. Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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