David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49 (2013)
In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, a great deal of literature has been developed recently concerning the nature of luck and anti-luck epistemology. The literature, however, has yet to explore the very intuitive idea that luck comes in degrees. I propose that once luck is recognized to admit degrees even the slightest non-zero degree (of the relevant sort) precludes knowledge. Connecting this to Zagzebski's thesis, I propose that a given theory of warrant must guarantee truth in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples (or subsequently deny that warrant bears any relationship to the truth whatsoever), simply because a sufficient standard analysis of knowledge cannot allow for knowledge that is even marginally lucky.
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Citations of this work BETA
Nathan Ballantyne (2014). Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology? Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.
Steven D. Hales (2015). A Problem for Moral Luck. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Ian M. Church (2013). Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived. Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.
Robert J. Hartman (2015). Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck. Philosophia 43 (1):77-95.
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