European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49 (2013)
|Abstract||: In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, a great deal of literature has been developed recently concerning the nature of luck and anti-luck epistemology. The literature, however, has yet to explore the very intuitive idea that luck comes in degrees. I propose that once luck is recognized to admit degrees even the slightest non-zero degree (of the relevant sort) precludes knowledge. Connecting this to Zagzebski's thesis, I propose that a given theory of warrant must guarantee truth in order to avoid Gettier counterexamples (or subsequently deny that warrant bears any relationship to the truth whatsoever), simply because a sufficient standard analysis of knowledge cannot allow for knowledge that is even marginally lucky|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jim Stone (2013). 'Unlucky' Gettier Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2).
Peter Baumann (forthcoming). No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Alan Musgrave (2012). Getting Over Gettier. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Luck and Interests. Synthese 185 (3):319-334.
Andrew Latus (2000). Moral and Epistemic Luck. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Neil Levy (2009). What, and Where, Luck Is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):489 – 497.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010). Luck as an Epistemic Notion. Synthese 176:361-377.
Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility.
Stephen Hetherington (2011). Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal. Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
Will Barrett (2006). Luck and Decision. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):73–87.
Added to index2010-08-27
Total downloads134 ( #3,295 of 549,113 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #5,039 of 549,113 )
How can I increase my downloads?