David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306 (2007)
Conceptualists have it that the representational content of perceptual experience is determined by the concepts a subject applies in having such an experience. Conceptualists like Bill Brewer  and John McDowell  have laid particular emphasis on demonstrative concepts in trying to account for the fact that subjects can perceive and discriminate very many specific shades of colour in experience. Against this, it has been objected that such demonstrative concepts have incoherent conditions of extension and/or of individuation, due to the fact that chromatic indiscriminability is non-transitive. In this paper, I consider three different versions of this objection and show why each fails
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References found in this work BETA
Brewer Bill (2005). Does Perceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 231--250.
John Campbell (1987). Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
Citations of this work BETA
Diana Raffman (2012). Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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