Dialogue 21 (June):223-38 (1982)
|Abstract||Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position|
|Keywords||Biology Cognition Functionalism Metaphysics Thinking|
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