Is 'thinker' a natural kind?

Dialogue 21 (June):223-38 (1982)
Abstract
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position
Keywords Biology  Cognition  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Thinking
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. Christopher Maloney (1986). About Being a Bat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (March):26-49.
J. Christopher Maloney (1985). About Being a Bat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):26 – 49.
J. Christopher Maloney (1986). Sensuous Content. Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.

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