Is 'thinker' a natural kind?

Dialogue 21 (June):223-38 (1982)
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position
Keywords Biology  Cognition  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Thinking
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S001221730001636X
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,822
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
J. Christopher Maloney (1986). About Being a Bat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (March):26-49.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

35 ( #91,821 of 1,724,741 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #81,198 of 1,724,741 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.