Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties

Theory and Decision 52 (2):127-138 (2002)
Abstract In normative decision theory, the weight of an uncertain event in a decision is governed solely by the probability of the event. A large body of empirical research suggests that a single notion of probability does not accurately capture peoples' reactions to uncertainty. As early as the 1920s, Knight made the distinction between cases where probabilities are known and where probabilities are unknown. We distinguish another case –- the unknowable uncertainty –- where the missing information is unavailable to all. We propose that missing information influences the attractiveness of a bet contingent upon an uncertain event, especially when the information is available to someone else. We demonstrate that the unknowable uncertainty –- falls in preference somewhere in between the known and the known uncertainty
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Sven Ove Hansson (1996). Decision Making Under Great Uncertainty. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (3):369-386.
    Glenn Tiller (2006). The Unknowable: The Pragmatist Critique of Matter. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):206-228.
    Matthew C. Wilson (2009). Creativity, Probability and Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (1):45-56.
    Niki Pfeifer (2007). Rational Argumentation Under Uncertainty. In G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (eds.), Persuasion Und Wissenschaft: Aktuelle Fragestellungen von Rhetorik Und Argumentationstheorie. Lit.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-02

    Total downloads

    4 ( #180,507 of 556,840 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #64,931 of 556,840 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums