Non-transitive looks & fallibilism

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200 (2010)
Abstract
Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting putative cases of non-transitivity, fallibilists would have to claim that there can’t be any perceptual limitations of any kind on human chromatic discrimination. But there are good reasons to think such limitations exist.
Keywords Chromatic appearances  Looks  Non-transitivity  Phenomenal sorites arguments  Perceptual limitations  Veridical experience  Fallibilism  Colour  Colour perception  Perceptual discrimination
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.

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