Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200 (2010)
|Abstract||Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting putative cases of non-transitivity, fallibilists would have to claim that there can’t be any perceptual limitations of any kind on human chromatic discrimination. But there are good reasons to think such limitations exist.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Boris Rähme (2007). Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification. In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget.
Charles Pelling (2008). Exactness, Inexactness, and the Non-Transitivity of Perceptual Indiscriminability. Synthese 164 (2):289 - 312.
Tomoji Shogenji (2003). A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2000). Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
Philippe Chuard (2007). Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
Delia Graff Fara (2001). Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites. Mind 110 (440):905-935.
Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
Charlie Pelling (2007). Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234.
Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,789 of 739,447 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,447 )
How can I increase my downloads?