David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200 (2010)
Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting putative cases of non-transitivity, fallibilists would have to claim that there can’t be any perceptual limitations of any kind on human chromatic discrimination. But there are good reasons to think such limitations exist.
|Keywords||Chromatic appearances Looks Non-transitivity Phenomenal sorites arguments Perceptual limitations Veridical experience Fallibilism Colour Colour perception Perceptual discrimination|
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (2005). Perception and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
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