Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81 (1981)
|Abstract||A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely|
|Keywords||Body Experience Metaphysics Mind Libet, B|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.
Benjamin W. Libet, Feinstein E. W. & Pearl B. (1979). Subjective Referral of the Timing for a Cognitive Sensory Experience. Brain 102:193-224.
Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Timing of Conscious Experience: Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet's Findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
Gilberto Gomes (1998). The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet's Research. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
Gabriel Vacariu (2011). The Mind-Body Problem Today. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-34.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Ted Honderich (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the Mind Ahead of the Brain? Behind It? In On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh University Press.
Benjamin W. Libet (1981). The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P.S. Churchland. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #40,509 of 722,745 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,745 )
How can I increase my downloads?