David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87 (1988)
The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and (3) to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments
|Keywords||Cognition Epistemology Neutrality Perception Plasticity Science|
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Citations of this work BETA
Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
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