Two grades of evidential bias

Philosophy of Science 42 (3):250-259 (1975)
It is argued herein that there are two distinct ways in which all observation vocabularies are prejudiced with respect to theory. An argument based on the demands of adequate translation is invoked to show that even the simplest of our observation predicates must display the first and more obvious grade of bias--intensional bias. It is also argued that any observation vocabulary whose predicates are corrigibly applicable must manifest a second and equally serious grade of bias--extensional bias--independently of whatever intensional bias its predicates may or may not have
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DOI 10.1086/288640
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N. R. Lane & S. A. Lane (1981). Paradigms and Perception. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (1):47-60.

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