The hornswoggle problem

Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8 (1996)
Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine a mechanism is a rather uninteresting psychological fact about us, not an interesting metaphysical fact about the world. Rather than worrying too much about the meta-problem of whether or not consciousness is uniquely hard, I propose we get on with the task of seeing how far we get when we address neurobiologically the problems of mental phenomena
Keywords Consciousness  Philosophy  Psychology  Science  Nagel, T
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Daniel T. Linger (2010). What Is It Like to Be Someone Else? Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 38 (2):205-229.
Wayne Wright (2007). Explanation and the Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.

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Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984). Is Consciousness Important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
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Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.

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