What Intuitions Are Like

Abstract
What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
Keywords Phenomenology  Intuition  Perception
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.
George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.

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