What Intuitions Are Like

What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
Keywords Phenomenology  Intuition  Perception
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00463.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2015). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):n/a-n/a.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.

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