A defense of subsequent consent

Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):117-131 (2009)
Abstract
Subsequent consent can be morally efficacious.  First, it licenses nostalgia and dismissiveness no more than its prior cousin does.  Second, it's coherent because linked to the mental state of not minding.  Third, it's just as vulnerable to bilking as prior consent is, as is clear once we distinguish between basing moral assessments on expectations versus on actual outcomes.  Fourth, mind control is illegitimate because it short circuits the subject's will, not because its consent is subsequent.  Finally, our intuitions about rape show that dissent sometimes outweighs consent in matters of sex, not that subsequent consent is always inefficacious.
Keywords consent  subsequent consent
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    Tom Dougherty (2014). Fickle Consent. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):25-40.
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