Ratio Juris 23 (3):333-364 (2010)
|Abstract||In a variety of disciplines, there exists a consensus that human rights are individual claim rights that all human beings possess simply as a consequence of being human. That consensus seems to me to obscure the real character of the concept and hinder the progress of discussion. I contend that rather than thinking of human rights in the first instance as “claim rights” possessed by individuals, we should regard human rights as higher order norms that articulate standards of legitimacy for sociopolitical and legal institutions|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gary B. Herbert (2005). On the Misconceived Genealogy of Human Rights. Social Philosophy Today 21:17-32.
Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone (eds.) (2003). Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions. OUP Oxford.
Barbara de Mori (2001). Human Rights and Concept of Person. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):159-169.
Louis Pojman (1991). A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism. Faith and Philosophy 8 (4):481-504.
W. J. Talbott (2010). Human Rights and Human Well-Being. Oxford University Press.
Sumner B. Twiss (2004). History, Human Rights, and Globalization. Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (1):39 - 70.
John Mahoney (2007). The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, Development, and Significance. Blackwell Pub..
Doris Schroeder (forthcoming). Human Rights and Human Dignity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
J. Ci (2005). Taking the Reasons for Human Rights Seriously. Political Theory 33 (2):243 - 265.
Added to index2010-08-16
Total downloads91 ( #7,544 of 549,049 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,703 of 549,049 )
How can I increase my downloads?