Agent causation and the problem of luck

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421 (2005)
: On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck
Keywords Agency  Causation  Epistemology  Free Will  Luck
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00234.x
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Alfred R. Mele (2014). Luck and Free Will. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.

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