Aesop's fox: Consequentialist virtue meets egocentric bias

Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):727 – 737 (2009)
Abstract
In her book Uneasy Virtue, Julia Driver presents an account of motive or trait utilitarianism, one that has been taken as “the most detailed and thoroughly defended recent formulation” of consequential virtue ethics. On Driver's account character traits are morally virtuous if and only if they generally lead to good consequences for society. Various commentators have taken Driver to task over this account of virtue, which she terms “pure evaluational externalism.” They object that, on Driver's account of virtue, it could turn out that traits traditionally understood as pernicious are actually virtuous. While many writers have speculated about the forms new 'virtues' might take in a hypothetical world, I will argue that at least one trait that is seemingly pernicious but would have to be counted as virtuous by Driver already exists
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References found in this work BETA
William K. Frankena (1973). Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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