Autonomous reasons for intending

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212 (2008)
An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view are considered and rejected. Finally, it is considered whether the existence of such reasons would conflict with an attractive coherence principle linking the rationality of intending with that of acting as intended. The paper concludes with a qualified affirmation of autonomous reasons for intending.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400801886181
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Noa Latham (2003). Are There Any Nonmotivating Reasons for Action? In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 273.
Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
John Gibbons (2009). Reason in Action. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 72.
Thomas Scanlon (2007). Structural Irrationality. In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press
Wayne A. Davis (1984). A Causal Theory of Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

59 ( #56,333 of 1,725,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #93,199 of 1,725,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.