A Theory of Sentience

New York: Oxford University Press (2000)
Austen Clark offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call "sensory." Drawing on the findings of current neuroscience, Clark defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that he calls "feature-placing." Sensing proceeds by picking out place-times in or around the body of the sentient organism, and characterizing qualities (features) that appear at those place-times. The hypothesis casts light on many other troublesome phenomena, including the varieties of illusion, the problem of projection, the notion of a visual field, and the existence of sense-data
Keywords Data  Epistemology  Perception  Sentience  Space
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Call number BD214.C535 2000
ISBN(s) 0198238517   9780198238515
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Clare Batty (2011). Smelling Lessons. Philosophical Studies 153 (Mar.):161-174.
John Zeimbekis (2013). Color and Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.

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