David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115 (2004)
A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework. Footnotes1 I would like to thank Wlodek Rabinowicz and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments.
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Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Payoff Uncertainty in Games. Synthese 163 (1):79-97.
Boudewijn De Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Payoff Uncertainty in Games. Synthese 163 (1):79 - 97.
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