Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons

Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319 (2007)
Abstract
It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate
Keywords Epistemic closure  Defeasibility  Conclusive reasons  Knowledge  Epistemic justification  Epistemic rationality
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References found in this work BETA
Claudio Almeida (2001). What Moore's Paradox Is About. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33 - 58.
A. L. Brueckner (2000). Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.

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