David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391 - 409 (2007)
It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka’s toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as commanded. Here it is argued that ordinary agents in ordinary cases can have justifying reasons for deciding that are not and will not be justifying reasons for doing what, in making those decisions, they come to intend to do. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the functions of decision-making.
|Keywords||decision intention practical reason rationality|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Robert Audi (1973). Intending. Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.
John Bishop (1990). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael Bratman (1998). Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. 59--83.
Citations of this work BETA
James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
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