Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction
Theory and Decision 54 (4):315-336 (2003)
| Abstract | The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived | |||||||||
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