David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):701-722 (2001)
In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's () earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC is clarified and a revised version of Cartwright's argument for defensible middle ground, which is free of the identified defects, is presented.
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Steve Clarke (2009). Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural. Sophia 48 (2):127-142.
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