Defensible territory for entity realism

In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's ([1983]) earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC is clarified and a revised version of Cartwright's argument for defensible middle ground, which is free of the identified defects, is presented.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/52.4.701
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E. B. Davies (2003). Quantum Mechanics Does Not Require the Continuity of Space. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (2):319-328.

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