David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 101 (3):401-31 (1994)
Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper we first present, and then critically assess, a variety of recent anti-representationalist treatments. We suggest that so far, at least, the sceptical rhetoric outpaces both evidence and argument. Some probable causes of this premature scepticism are isolated. Nonetheless, the anti-representationalist challenge is shown to be both important and progressive insofar as it forces us to see beyond the bare representational/non-representational dichotomy and to recognize instead a rich continuum of degrees and types of representationality
|Keywords||Cognitive Computation Connectionism Epistemology Mind Representation Science|
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Citations of this work BETA
Andy Clark (1999). An Embodied Cognitive Science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.
William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin (2014). Representation-Hunger Reconsidered. Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
Alex Morgan (2014). Representations Gone Mental. Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
Eric Arnau, Saray Ayala & Thomas Sturm (2014). Cognitive Externalism Meets Bounded Rationality. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):50-64.
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