David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41 (1999)
This paper examines the libertarian account of free choice advanced by Robert Kane in his recent book, The Significance of Free Will. First a rather simple libertarian view is considered, and an objection is raised against it the view fails to provide for any greater degree of agent-control than what could be available in a deterministic world. The basic differences between this simple view and Kane's account are the requirements, on the latter, of efforts of will and of an agent's wanting more to do a certain thing than he wants to do anything else. It is argued here that neither of these features yields any improvement over the simple libertarian view; neither helps to meet the objection that was raised against the simple view. Finally, it is suggested that a modest defense of that view might be available.
|Keywords||Effort Free Choice Free Will Libertarianism Metaphysics Kane, R|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Jing Zhu (2004). How to Make an Effort: A Reply to E. J. Coffman. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):23-33.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2001). Free Will. Blackwell.
Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will, and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
E. J. Coffman (2004). On Making an Effort. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):11-21.
Robert F. Allen (2005). Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.
Randolph Clarke (1996). Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #56,516 of 1,692,513 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #181,267 of 1,692,513 )
How can I increase my downloads?