David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):465 – 485 (2009)
This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality. I begin by introducing Gibbard's theory before testing some key assumptions underlying his system against recent empirical data and theories. The results cast doubt on some crucial aspects of Gibbard's philosophical theory, namely his reduction of morality to anger and guilt, and his theory of “normative governance.” Gibbard's particular version of expressivism may be undermined by these doubts
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References found in this work BETA
A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2001). The Subtlety of Emotions. A Bradford Book.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Thomas L. Carson (1992). Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):953 - 956.
Citations of this work BETA
Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Punitive Emotions and Norm Violations. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.
Christine Clavien (2009). Comment Comprendre les Émotions Morales. Dialogue 48 (03):601-.
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