Genic Representation: Reconciling Content and Causal Complexity
| Abstract | Some recent cognitive-scientific research suggests that a considerable amount of intelligent action is generated not by the systematic activity of internal representations, but by complex interactions involving neural, bodily, and environmental fators. Following an analysis of this threat to representational explanation, we persue an analogy between roles of genes in the production of the biological form and the role of neural states in the production of behaviour, in order to develop a notion of of genic representation. | |||||||||
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