How reason can be practical: A reply to Hume

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):213-230 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Opponents of Humean skepticism about practical reason do not normally exploit his idea that beliefs can only serve the aims we have. Many have used that idea to argue in favour of Humean skepticism. Others have denied that it supports Humean skepticism. I argue that we need to use this idea. It is only by embracing the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation that we can truly see where Hume went wrong.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Formal principles and the form of a law.Andrews Reath - 2010 - In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
Hume on practical reason.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):365–389.
Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason.David Phillips - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.
Practical reason and motivational scepticism.Paul Russell - 2006 - In Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
Practical reason, value and action.Alison Hills - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.
Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason.Michelle Mason - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
58 (#248,081)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Philip Clark
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references