Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 73 (1):123 - 131 (2010)
|Abstract||I discuss a modification of Lewisian modal realism called 'inclusionism'. Inclusionism is the thesis that some worlds contain other worlds as proper parts. Inclusionism has some attractive consequences for theories of modality. Josh Parsons, however, has raised a problem for inclusionism: the problem of unmarried husbands. In this paper I reply to this problem. My strategy is twofold: first I claim, pace Parsons, that it is not clear why the inclusionist cannot avail herself of an obvious solution to the problem; and second, I argue that even if there is no available solution, the same problem also afflicts Lewis' original theory. Therefore, even if the problem remains unsolved, we have not been given any reason to think that an inclusionist version of Lewisian realism is worse than the original|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
Howard Sankey (1995). The Problem of Rational Theory-Choice. Epistemologia 18 (2):299-312.
Piet Strydom (2001). The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas. Sociological Theory 19 (2):165-186.
Ian T. E. Boyd (1996). The Problem of Self-Destroying Sin in John Milton's Samson Agonistes. Faith and Philosophy 13 (4):487-507.
Joseph A. Baltimore (2011). Lewis' Modal Realism and Absence Causation. Metaphysica 12 (2):117-124.
Kevin B. Korb (1998). The Frame Problem: An AI Fairy Tale. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):317-351.
Earl Conee (2013). The Specificity of the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
Timothy J. Bayne (2001). The Inclusion Model of the Incarnation: Problems and Prospects. Religious Studies 37 (2):125-141.
Josh Parsons (2007). Is Everything a World? Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.
Added to index2010-03-13
Total downloads39 ( #34,755 of 739,325 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,325 )
How can I increase my downloads?