Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ()
Abstract
To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
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