Intentional omissions

Noûs 44 (1):158-177 (2010)
Abstract
It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
Keywords cause  intention  omission  reason
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    References found in this work BETA
    Helen Beebee (2004). Causing and Nothingness. In L. A. Paul, E. J. Hall & J. Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. The Mit Press. 291--308.

    View all 36 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    Sara Bernstein (2013). Omissions as Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.
    Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.

    View all 6 citations

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