Intentional omissions

Noûs 44 (1):158-177 (2010)
It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
Keywords cause  intention  omission  reason
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00735.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sara Bernstein (2013). Omissions as Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.
Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.
Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.

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