Inversions spectral and bright: Comments on Melinda Campbell
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Spectrum inversion is a thought experiment, and I would wager that there is no better diagnostic test to the disciplinary affiliation of a randomly selected member of the audience than your reaction to a thought experiment. It is a litmus test. If you find that you are paying close attention, subvocalizing objections, and that your heart-rate and metabolism go up, you have turned pink: you are a philosopher. If on the other hand the thought experiment leaves you cold, and you wonder why otherwise sensible people would worry about such things, you have turned blue and you are a psychologist
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Melinda B. Fagan (2011). Social Experiments in Stem Cell Biology. Perspectives on Science 19 (3):235-262.
James Van Cleve (2006). Touch, Sound, and Things Without the Mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182.
Neil Campbell (2004). Generalizing Qualia Inversion. Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.
W. J. (1996). The Evidential Significance of Thought Experiment in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):233-250.
Michael A. Bishop (1999). Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):534-541.
Timm Triplett (2006). Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions. Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
Felipe De Brigard (2010). If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real? Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
Neil Campbell (2000). Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.
Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?