Kantian morals and Humean motives

Abstract
The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
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References found in this work BETA
David O. Brink (1986). Externalist Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
Tyler Burge (1977). Belief de Re. Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.

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