David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell's picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal minions, the "knowledge of reference" which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two. But first let us clarify what the argument is.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Austen Clark (2006). Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
Athanasios Raftopoulos (2009). Reference, Perception, and Attention. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
Austen Clark (2006). Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127:167-193.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Sean D. Kelly (2004). Reference and Attention: A Difficult Connection. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):277-86.
Anne Newstead (2004). Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript). Dissertation, Oxford University
Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
F. de Brigard (2010). Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
Sebastian Watzl (2011). The Philosophical Significance of Attention. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
Joseph Shieber (2009). Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.
Sebastian Watzl (2011). Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 145.
R. W. Kentridge, L. H. de-Wit & C. A. Heywood (2008). What is Attended in Spatial Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):105-111.
Massimo Grassia (2004). Consciousness and Perceptual Attention: A Methodological Argument. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-23.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads1 ( #498,231 of 1,410,002 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #176,758 of 1,410,002 )
How can I increase my downloads?