Minds, memes, and rhetoric

Inquiry 36 (1-2):3-16 (1993)
Dennett's Consciousness Explained presents, but does not demonstrate, a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain. If he were correct, realism and methodological individualism would collapse, as would the very enterprise of giving reasons. The metaphors he deploys actually testify to the power of metaphoric imagination that can no more be identified with the metaphors it creates than minds can be identified with memes. That latter equation, of minds with meme?complexes, rests for its meaning on the existence of real minds, which are not to be equated with the thoughts they have
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Epistemology  Mind  Realism  Rhetoric  Science  Dennett, D
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Stephen R. L. Clark (1994). The Possible Truth of Metaphor. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1):19 – 30.
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