Mackie's motivational argument Philip Clark
| Abstract | Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value. In thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that Mackie vastly overstated the motivational implications of moral judgment. Mackie did go overboard. But did he have to? I think not. Even on the most modest motivational assumptions, Mackie can make objective value look queer and morality look like a sham. I begin with a sketch. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesMichael Strevens (2007). Mackie Remixed. In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press.
Penelope Mackie (2006). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Published in the United States by Oxford University Press.
Charles R. Pigden (2007). Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441 - 456.
Richard Otte (1996). Mackie's Treatment of Miracles. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (3):151 - 158.
David Phillips (2007). Mackie on Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):457 - 468.
Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
Bart Streumer (2010). Reasons for Action * Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):200-202.
Philip Clark (2009). Mackie's Motivational Argument. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads12 ( #93,386 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
