Minimal rationalism

Mind 102 (408):587-610 (1993)
Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms
Keywords Connectionism  Epistemology  Innate  Knowledge  Nativism  Rationalism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/102.408.588
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