David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 102 (408):587-610 (1993)
Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms
|Keywords||Connectionism Epistemology Innate Knowledge Nativism Rationalism|
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Manuel Garc�A.-Carpintero (1996). Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality. Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-172.
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