`Obviously propositions are nothing': Russell and the logical form of belief reports
In Georg Peter & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Oxford University Press (2002)
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Kevin C. Klement (2001). Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's Response Adequate? History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.
Paul M. Livingston (2001). Russellian and Wittgensteinian Atomism. Philosophical Investigations 24 (1):30–54.
Emar Maier (2005). De Re and de Se in Quantified Belief Reports. In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
Heimir Geirsson (1998). True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.
Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2002). What is Logical Form? In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press.
Kevin C. Klement, Russell-Myhill Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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