Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry

It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and explains judgments about a variety of omissions cases, including intentional omissions as well as simple failures to act.
Keywords ability to do otherwise  moral responsibility  omission
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00480.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.

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