Progress and the argument from evil
Religious Studies 40 (2):181-192 (2004)
| Abstract | The argument from evil, though it is the most effective rhetorical argument against orthodox theism, fails to demonstrate its conclusion, since we are unavoidably ignorant whether there is more evil than could possibly be justified. That same ignorance infects any claims to discern a divine purpose in nature, as well as recent attempts at a broadly Irenaean theodicy. Evolution is not, on neo-Darwinian theory, intellectually, morally, or spiritually progressive in the way that some religious thinkers have supposed. To suppose so, indeed, is to misidentify the evils we should fear. But though we should neither conceal the evils of the world nor offer any consequentialist justification of them, we may still reasonably maintain an orthodox theism. Evil is not created so that otherwise unattainable goods may come, but is an unavoidable byproduct of creation which it is – or may be – God's purpose to redeem. (Published Online April 21 2004). | |||||||||
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Brice R. Wachterhauser (1985). The Problem of Evil and Moral Scepticism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):167 - 174.
Richard Otte (2000). Evidential Arguments From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
Ian Wilks (2004). The Structure of the Contemporary Debate on the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (3):307-321.
Robert Lehe (2009). The Nihilistic Consequences of the Argument From Evil. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):427-437.
Robert Bass (2011). Many Inscrutable Evils. Ars Disputandi 11:118-132.
James A. Keller (1989). The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3):155 - 171.
Michael Almeida (2004). The New Evidential Argument Defeated. Philo 7 (1):22-35.
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