David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press (2005)
When you suffer a pain are you suffering a sensation? An emotion? An aversion? Pain typically has all three components, and others too. There is indeed a distinct sensory system devoted to pain, with its own nociceptors and pathways. As a species of somesthesis, pain has a distinctive sensory organization and its own special sensory qualities. I think it is fair to call it a distinct sensory modality, devoted to nociceptive somesthetic discrimination. But the typical pain kicks off other processes too. For one it can grab your attention in a distinctive way, alerting you to its presence and sometimes obliging you to focus attention on the damaged member. Intense pain can eliminate your ability to think about anything else. Pain typically has direct and immediate motivational consequences: one wants it to stop, has an incentive to do whatever one can to reduce it, and is gratified by its termination. As these desires and motives collide with neural reality, emotional components of mental anguish, anxiety, and dread arise. The suffering involved in suffering from pain has multiple strands: it is not just the painfulness of the sensation, or the frustration of the desire that it end, but also the anguish over the possibility that it will never end, and the impossibility, if the pain is sufficiently intense, of focusing one’s attention on anything else
|Keywords||Pain Perception Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul Boswell (2016). Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger. Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
Jennifer Corns (2014). The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.
Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
Jennifer Corns (2014). The Social Pain Posit. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):561-582.
Similar books and articles
C. Richard Chapman (2004). Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience. In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. 59-85.
Yutaka Nakamura & C. Chapman (2002). Constructing Pain: How Pain Hurts. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins
Lance M. McCracken (2007). A Contextual Analysis of Attention to Chronic Pain: What the Patient Does with Their Pain Might Be More Important Than Their Awareness or Vigilance Alone. Journal of Pain 8 (3):230-236.
Irwin Goldstein (1983). Pain and Masochism. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.
David E. Boeyink (1974). Pain and Suffering. Journal of Religious Ethics 2 (1):85 - 98.
Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Nikola Grahek (1991). Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.
Eric A. Salzen (2002). The Feeling of Pain and the Emotion of Distress. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):471-471.
Marshall Devor (2007). Pain, Cortex, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):89-90.
Terry Dartnall (2001). The Pain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #130,973 of 1,938,743 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #219,228 of 1,938,743 )
How can I increase my downloads?