David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59 (2008)
Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before). The present paper displays the tension, scouts the space of possible responses, and ends by attempting to specify what the body actually needs to be, given its complex role in these recent debates.
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Citations of this work BETA
Vittorio Gallese & Corrado Sinigaglia (2011). What is so Special About Embodied Simulation? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (11):512-519.
Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
Richard Heersmink (2015). Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive Systems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):577-598.
Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (2009). Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many? Topoi 28 (1):1-7.
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