Synthese 65 (December):377-405 (1985)
|Abstract||Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or "qualia" are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia.|
|Keywords||Experience Perception Psychology Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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