Graduate studies at Western
Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23 (1984)
|Abstract||Marr's computational theory of stereopsis is shown to imply that human vision employs a system of representation which has all the properties of a number system. Claims for an internal number system and for neural computation should be taken literally. I show how these ideas withstand various skeptical attacks, and analyze the requirements for describing neural operations as computations. Neural encoding of numerals is shown to be distinct from our ability to measure visual physiology. The constructs in Marr's theory are neither propositional nor pictorial, and provide a counter example to many commonly held dichotomies concerning mental representation|
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