Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Drawing on work in psychophysics, psychometrics, and sensory neurophysiology, Clark analyzes the character and defends the integrity of psychophysical explanations of qualitative facts, arguing that the structure of such explanations is sound and potentially successful|
|Keywords||Senses and sensation Perception Philosophy of mind Psychology Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$7.98 used (87% off) $39.98 new (34% off) $53.46 direct from Amazon (11% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD214.C53 1993|
|ISBN(s)||9780198240013 0198236808 0198240015|
|Through your library||Configure|
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