Selective representing and world-making

Minds and Machines 12 (3):383-395 (2002)
In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing — the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is fully consistent with the realist idea of a mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that the latter provides the most powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing perceptual and cog- nitive profiles themselves. And third, that the sense in which organism and environment may together constitute an integrated system of scientific interest poses no additional threat to the realist conception
Keywords Metaphysics  Niche  Realism  Representation  World
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DOI 10.1023/A:1016159621665
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Karim Zahidi (2014). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.

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