David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Adaptive Behavior 7 (1):5-16 (1999)
There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of internal representation. This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the basic premises of the work (in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the first place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering an account (an example and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal Robust Representationalism (MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about this notion. We end (Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our account, a science (e.g., robot- ics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2011). The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.
Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey (2011). Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.
Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
Matteo Colombo (2010). How Authentic Intentionality Can Be Enabled: A Neurocomputational Hypothesis. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):183-202.
Similar books and articles
Chris Eliasmith (1997). Computation and Dynamical Models of Mind. Minds and Machines 7 (4):531-41.
Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (1994). Doing Without Representing. Synthese 101 (3):401-31.
Rick Grush (2003). In Defense of Some "Cartesian" Assumption Concerning the Brain and its Operation. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):53-92.
John P. Sullins (2002). Building Simple Mechanical Minds: Using Lego Robots for Research and Teaching in Philosophy. In James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing. Blackwell Pub.. 110-122.
Lawrence W. Barsalou (2010). Grounded Cognition: Past, Present, and Future. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):716-724.
Michael Wheeler (1998). An Appeal for Liberalism, or Why Van Gelder's Notion of a Dynamical System is Too Narrow for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):653-654.
Pim Haselager, A. de Groot & H. van Rappard (2003). Representationalism Vs. Anti-Representationalism: A Debate for the Sake of Appearance. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):5-23.
Porfirio Silva & Pedro U. Lima (2007). Institutional Robotics. In F. Almeida e Costa et al (ed.), Advances in Artificial Life. ECAL 2007. Springer-Verlag.
Andy Clark (1997). The Dynamical Challenge. Cognitive Science 21 (4):461-481.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads79 ( #16,350 of 1,099,048 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #22,488 of 1,099,048 )
How can I increase my downloads?